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This paper analyzes the response of earnings to payroll tax rates using a cohort-based reform in Greece.
All individuals who started working on or after 1993 face permanently a much higher earnings cap
for payroll taxes, creating a large and permanent discontinuity in marginal payroll tax rates by date
of entry in the labor force for upper earnings workers. Using full population administrative Social
Security data and a Regression Discontinuity Design, we estimate the long-term incidence and effects
of marginal payroll tax rates on earnings. Standard theory predicts that, in the long run, new regime
workers should bear the entire burden of the payroll tax increase (relative to old regime workers). In
contrast, we find that employers compensate new regime workers for the extra employer payroll taxes
but not for the extra employee payroll taxes. We do not find any evidence of labor supply responses
around the discontinuity, suggesting low efficiency costs of payroll taxes. The non-standard incidence
results are the same across firms of different sizes. Tax incidence, however, is standard for older workers
in the new regime as they bear both the employee and employer tax. Those results, combined with
a direct small survey of employers, can be explained by social norms regarding seniority-based pay
which create a growing wedge between pay and productivity as workers age.
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In most OECD countries, social insurance programs such as public retirement benets, public
health insurance, disability and unemployment benets, are nanced by social security con-
tributions on employment income. Such payroll taxes are quite large and impose signicant
marginal tax rates on earnings in countries with generous social insurance programs. Payroll
taxes collect about 25% of total revenue on average in OECD countries (OECD, 2008), which
is about the same as personal income taxes. Payroll taxes are much simpler than individual
income taxes and share some key characteristics: (1) The base is in general restricted to em-
ployment earnings. (2) Tax rates are at.1 (3) The tax often applies only to earnings below a
given cap.2 (4) Payroll taxes are nominally shared by employers and employees. In a standard
model, this nominal sharing does not matter for incidence and behavioral responses and, as a
result, only the combined tax is relevant. To assess the eciency and welfare consequences of
such large payroll taxes, it is critical to estimate how labor supply and labor demand respond
to them.
There is an extensive literature on the behavioral responses of reported income to the indi-
vidual income tax (see Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz (2009) for a recent survey). Relative to the
classic labor supply literature focusing on hours of work (see Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) for
a survey), the new reported income literature recognizes that there are many other potential
dimensions of responses such as unmeasured eort on the job, career choices, forms of compen-
sation (non taxable fringe benets, business vacations, etc.), and tax compliance. Those studies
use individual income tax changes to estimate the elasticity of reported income with respect to
marginal tax rates. There are two main issues with such elasticity estimates. First, non-tax
related changes in the income distribution might be improperly attributed to changes in taxes
when one compares a group aected by a tax change (such as high-income earners) to a compar-
ison group not aected by a tax change (such as lower income earners). Second, tax changes can
only credibly estimate short-term behavioral responses although long-term behavioral responses
are of most interest for policy.
1Tax rates sometimes vary by occupation but tend to be at for a given employee in a given occupation.
2Some countries apply dierent caps to dierent social contributions, creating tax rate variation by earnings
levels. For example, the United States has caps for Social Security retirement and disability contributions but
no cap for elderly health insurance Medicare contributions. Some countries such as the United Kingdom also
have oors exempting the rst slice of earnings from payroll taxes.
1In contrast, there is relatively little work on how payroll taxes aect labor supply. The
literature on payroll taxes has focused primarily on incidence. In principle, as we expect labor
demand to be substantially more elastic than labor supply, the incidence should be borne
primarily by workers (Hamermesh, 1993). This has been the standard assumption in most
analysis of the distributional eects of taxes (see e.g., Fullerton and Metcalf 2002 for a survey).3
Indeed, the most compelling macro-economic argument suggesting that the incidence is borne
primarily by workers is the fact that the labor income share (which includes all payroll taxes)
in GDP is fairly stable overtime and across countries (see e.g., OECD, 1990). A number of
studies have used micro-data (either individual or at the industry level) and exploited payroll
tax changes to analyze incidence eects and have found mixed results (Hamermesh 1979, Neubig
1981, Holmlund 1983, Gruber 1997, Anderson and Meyer, 1997, 2000, Lang 2003). Some studies
have also tried to test whether the sharing of payroll taxes between employees and employers
is irrelevant but have not reached a consensus on this question (Poterba et al. 1986, Dusek
2002, Mulligan, Gil, and Sala-i-Martin 2002). Importantly, those studies use standard payroll
tax changes and hence suer from the same two criticisms as the taxable income elasticity
literature: identication is not fully compelling and the studies estimate short-run eects.
In this paper, we exploit an unusual payroll tax reform in Greece to estimate the long-run
incidence and eects of taxes on earnings which overcomes identication diculties that have
plagued previous work. Greece has very high payroll tax rates on private sector workers with
an employer tax rate of 28% and employee tax rate of 16% (on average), creating a combined
marginal tax wedge of about 35% as a proportion of labor costs (gross earnings) Those payroll
taxes apply up to a monthly earnings cap above which no marginal tax is charged. In late
1992, Greece introduced a reform in its payroll tax system to raise more revenue and restore
the nancial balance of its social insurance programs. The payroll tax change, however, applies
only to new entrants, i.e., workers starting to work and pay payroll taxes on or after January
1st, 1993. Employees who started to work before 1993 continue to pay a combined employee
and employer payroll tax up to a monthly cap equal to ¤2315 as of 2007. In contrast, employees
who started to work on or after 1993, pay the same payroll tax rates but up to a much higher
3This incidence assumption is also implicitly made in the reported income elasticity studies. A few studies
have shown that this assumption does not necessarily hold in reality and that employers may share part of the
burden. See Bingley and Lanot (2002) and Kubik (2004) for the income tax and Leigh (2010) and Rothstein
(2009) for the US Earned Income Tax Credit.
2cap, equal to 2.3 times the old cap (¤5280 of monthly earnings as of 2007).4 As a result, today,
about 10% of workers who entered shortly before 1993 are above the cap and face no payroll
taxes at the margin. In contrast, only about 1% of workers who entered shortly after 1993 are
above the new higher cap. Interestingly, this tax increase was not binding in the rst years
of the career as new entrants hardly ever had starting salaries above the old cap. However,
as workers gain experience over the years, more and more reach the old cap level of earnings.
Thus, the reform has eectively created two groups of workers who currently co-exist in the
same labor market but face sharply dierent tax rates when they reach 2315 euros of monthly
earnings (as of 2007).
Comparing pre-reform entrants to post-reform entrants using a regression discontinuity de-
sign (RDD) based on exact date of entry oers a unique opportunity to (a) evaluate the long-run
incidence of employee and employer payroll taxes on earnings, (b) estimate the long-term impact
of marginal tax rates on earnings. For this study, we have obtained access to administrative
data from IKA, the social insurance agency in Greece, which manages payroll taxes and benets
for most private sector employees. The data include all individual workers in Greece who rst
entered the IKA system in any of the 10 years from 1988 to 1997. The data include the year
of birth, gender, nationality, the exact day of entry in IKA (i.e., the rst day with covered
IKA earnings), and detailed job level and earnings variables for each of the months of March
2004, March 2005, March 2006, and March 2007. In each of those March datasets, and for each
job, we have occupation, monthly earnings broken down into various types: regular earnings,
overtime earnings, bonuses, and other forms of earnings. Besides overtime earnings, the data
also include other measures of labor supply: monthly days of work, indicators for full day and
full week work, which can be used to construct a standard measure of hours of work. Finally,
the data include several employer level variables: industrial sector, geographical location, total
number of employees in the rm. The longitudinal structure of the database allow us to link
earnings and employers of each individual across time periods March 2004, March 2005, March
2006, and March 2007.
Four main results are presented in our analysis. First, we show that there is no discontinuity
in the number and composition of workers around the cut-o date showing that individuals did
not have time to game the law by rushing into the labor market in the last months of 1992 after
4Post-reform entrants had no cap at all on their payroll taxes from 1993 to 2003. In 2004, a cap equal to 2.3
the old cap was introduced.
3the law was enacted and before 1993 to take advantage of the old regime.
Second and most important, we obtain non-standard incidence results. In principle, indi-
viduals entering shortly before 1993 and shortly after 1993 should be identical to employers
and hence should receive the same gross earnings{as they are equally productive. However, we
nd that employers are willing to compensate new regime employees for their higher employer
payroll taxes but not for their higher employee payroll taxes. As a result, new regime employees
above the cap have (a) higher labor costs, i.e., gross earnings including all payroll taxes than
old regime employers, (b) same posted earnings (the ocial measure of earnings which excludes
employer payroll taxes but includes employee payroll taxes), (c) lower net earnings (when de-
ducting all payroll taxes). Those results are true for total earnings (base pay + overtime +
bonuses) but also for regular earnings (base pay).
Third, we nd no evidence of eects of the payroll marginal tax rate dierential on labor
supply. Even if new regime workers bear only the employee portion of extra payroll taxes, this
still reduces signicantly (by 16% on average) net earnings at the margin relative to old regime
workers. However, we nd no evidence that new regime workers work fewer days, are less likely
to report overtime earnings, bonuses, or take-up more than one job. The elasticity of hours of
work with respect to the net-of-tax rate that we estimate is very close to zero and insignicant,
which implies low eciency costs of payroll taxes.
Fourth, we nd that the incidence is standard, i.e. employers shift the burden of employer
payroll taxes on workers, for older workers (conditional on date of entry in IKA). However,
there is no heterogeneity across rm's size. There is suggestive evidence that turnover is higher
among new regime workers.
Finally, a survey of a few employers suggests that indeed employers do not try to reduce
the earnings of new entrants in spite of the higher payroll taxes. In contrast to our prior views,
employers say that fairness concerns about treating similar employees (old regime vs. new
regime) dierently in terms of earnings is not the primary reason for those results. Almost all
employers report that young workers tend to be the most productive but are also those paid
the least because of norms regarding seniority-based pay. As a result, in spite of higher taxes
due to the new regime, those young workers remain protable hires to employers. We speculate
that norms of seniority-based pay increases force rms to increase the slope of the wage prole
relative to marginal productivity prole. Those norms seem to be based on posted earnings (as
4opposed to labor costs or net earnings). Firms may not be able to deviate from those norms
because doing so might negatively aect morale among employees or public relations and hence
not be protable in the long-run. Such norms could explain the non-standard incidence result
we obtained, and the fact that incidence is closer to standard for older workers.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the institutional details of the Greek
payroll tax and social insurance system, the administrative data we use for the analysis, and
the standard conceptual framework. Section 3 presents our empirical results. Section 4 presents
results from an employer survey and proposes a simple explanation accounting for the facts.
Finally Section 5 oers a brief conclusion and discusses policy implications.
2 Institutional Setting, Data, and Conceptual Frame-
work
2.1 The Greek Payroll Tax System and the 1992 Reform
Social benets in Greece accounted in 2004 for 26.0% of GDP (compared to an average of 27.3%
in the 25 countries who were European Union members in that year). As elsewhere in Europe,
social benets are mainly nanced through payroll taxes, also called social contributions.
Social insurance in Greece is fragmented along occupational lines. IKA, the social insurance
scheme for private sector employees, covers almost 2.0 million contributors, or 45% of all active
workers. The rest are divided among OAEE, the own-account workers' scheme for the self-
employed with over 800,000 contributors, the farmers' scheme with 700,000 contributors, the
civil servants' scheme with 450,000 contributors, as well as a number of special schemes covering
specic professions such as doctor, lawyers, or engineers. This paper focuses exclusively on IKA
workers.5
Social contributions payroll taxes for workers insured with IKA are set as proportion of
monthly earnings as shown in Table 1 and are shared by employees and employers. Total con-
tributions are quite high. Under the most common case (coverage code 101), the total employer
rate is 28.06% of earnings and the total employee rate is 16% of earnings.6 Employer contribu-
5There are signicant dierences in social insurance arrangements across schemes, in terms of contribution
rates and benets. Typically, the special schemes enjoy much more favorable terms relative to IKA, OAEE, and
the farmers' schemes.
6Workers in occupations classied as hazardous (about 40% of IKA contributors fall into that category) pay
even higher rates.
5tions are calculated on top of posted earnings, while employee contributions as deductions from
earnings. The same contribution rates apply to all earnings irrespective of type (e.g. regular pay,
overtime, bonus, etc.) or contract (e.g. full-time or part-time). Social insurance contributions
are payable from the rst euro earned and are always deducted at source by employers.
Importantly, contributions are based on monthly earnings and apply only up to a cap, above
which no payroll taxes apply. In 2007, the cap for employees under the old regime (i.e., those
employees who have IKA covered earnings before January 1st, 1993), was set at ¤2,315.00 of
monthly earnings in 2007. The cap for employees under the new regime (i.e., those employees
who do not have IKA covered earnings before January 1st, 1993), the cap was set at ¤5,279.57.
Both caps increase slightly each year, and by the same proportion, to reect nominal increases
in pay. The annual increases have been exactly 4% from 2004 to 2007 (the period we study).
There is no formal indexation and increases are legislated each year. Note that new regime
workers had no cap at all from 1993 to 2003. A cap set equal to 2.28 times the old regime cap
was rst introduced for new regime workers in 2004.
The contributions cap applies to all earnings irrespective of type, i.e., it is calculated by
adding together earnings from regular pay, overtime, bonus, etc. earned in a given month. In
the case of employees working for multiple employers, the cap for employer payroll taxes is based
on monthly earnings within a given employer while the cap for employee payroll taxes is based
on the sum of earnings across all employers. In practice, employers withhold both employee and
employer taxes from paychecks up to the monthly cap. Multi-employer workers can apply to IKA
for a refund of their employee contributions (but not the corresponding employer contributions)
paid in excess of the cap.7 In the case of part-time employees, in the sense of workers employed
for fewer days than the regular number of working days in the month, the cap is calculated on
a pro-rata basis but only for old regime workers.8
 Interactions with the Income Tax
Income taxes are based on annual income net of all social security contributions and follow
a progressive schedule, with marginal rates ranging from 15% to 40% in 2007. Income taxes are
also withheld at source, nal income taxes due are determined after the end of the nancial year,
when income returns are assessed taking into consideration tax relief and income from other
7Payroll taxes in the United States follow a similar rule, although US payroll taxes are based on annual
earnings, instead of monthly earnings.
8For new regime workers, there is no pro-rating.
6sources. Importantly, the income tax schedule is the same for old and new regime workers. As
a result, we do not incorporate income taxes in our analysis.
 The 1992 Pension Reform Act
In late 1992, Greece enacted the Pension Reform Act of 1992 (Law 2084/1992) to restore
nancial balance of the public retirement system. The reform aected contributions (payroll
taxes) and retirement benets on a cohort basis. As mentioned above, new insurees, dened
as individuals who did not have any covered earnings before January 1st, 1993 are treated
dierently from old insurees, dened as individuals who had some covered earnings before
January 1st, 1993. On the contribution side, as mentioned earlier, a higher upper earnings
ceiling (or, until 2003, no upper ceiling at all) was put in place for new insurees, leading to
higher payroll taxes for high earners. Social insurance contribution rates were increased for
both new and old insurees (contribution rates are always the same for new and old insurees).
On the retirement benet side, the law also changed the benets computation for new
insurees making the benets formula for new insurees slightly less generous than for old insurees.
In principle, this could create a lifetime wealth eect for new insurees (relative to old insurees)
which could lead to higher labor supply for new insurees. For the relatively young workers we
study in this paper, it is unlikely that this eect would be very large.9
However, and most important for our present analysis, retirement contributions can be
considered almost as a pure tax for workers far from retirement both in the old and new regime.
This is important because if benets are linked to contributions in an actuarially fair way and
if there are no credit constraints, then contributions would not be a tax. As a result, increased
contributions would have no impact on the lifetime budget constraint and hence should not
impact labor supply. For old regime workers, retirement benets are based on the total number
of insured days during the full career and the last ve years of earnings. As a result, changes
in the level of earnings at least ve years before retirement do not aect retirement benets.
Therefore, for young and middle age old regime workers at least 5 years away from retirement,
the retirement portion of social contributions is essentially a pure tax.10 For new regime workers,
9The discontinuity across cohorts in benets could aect retirement age and individual savings. Hence, the
sharp cohort based discontinuity created by the Greek reform could also be a useful \natural experiment" to
analyze retirement and savings decisions to changes in social security benets down the road.
10It is not exactly a pure tax, as supplying more labor when young could alter the full career path and lead
to higher earnings when older. As we mentioned above, it seems very unlikely that young workers would be
rational enough to take this eect into account when making their labor supply decisions.
7retirement benets are based on the total number of insured days during the full career and
the highest ve years of earnings among the last ten years of earnings. As a result, changes
in the level of earnings at least ten years before retirement do not aect retirement benets.
Therefore, for young and middle age new regime workers at least 10 years away from retirement,
the retirement portion of social contributions is also essentially a pure tax. Because our analysis
focuses on relatively young workers{those who entered the IKA system between 1988 and 1997,
as we shall see{retirement contributions are eectively a pure tax.
All the other contributions which nance sickness, unemployment, and other benets, create
virtually no linkage between the levels of contributions and benets and can also be considered
as pure taxes. Therefore, in this study, we will always consider all payroll taxes as pure taxes.
2.2 Administrative IKA Database
The data we use is extracted from the IKA administrative database. The data extract includes
all individual workers in Greece who rst entered the IKA system in any of the 10 calendar
years from 1988 to 1997. Hence our data spans 10 cohorts, 5 before the reform and 5 after
the reform. The core data include the year of birth, gender, nationality, the exact day of entry
in IKA (i.e., the rst day with covered IKA earnings), and insurance regime (old vs. new).
The core data also include the sum of total insured days as of the end of 2005, as well as total
2005 annual earnings (broken down into regular and additional earnings). The data include
scrambled individual identiers (dened as a transform of the actual social security number) to
link individuals across datasets.
We also have detailed job level and earnings variables for each of the months of March 2004,
March 2005, March 2006, and March 2007. In each of those March datasets, and for each job,
we have the number of days of work, occupation, monthly earnings, as well as full day and full
week indicators of labor supply. Individuals with more than one job during the month will have
more than one job record. Individuals are identied by their (scrambled) individual identiers.
The monthly earnings are broken down into various types: regular earnings, overtime earnings,
bonuses, and other forms of earnings. Earnings are reported in full with no cap. The data also
include the exact employer and employee tax rates (which depend on the insurance code), as
well as the exact amount of employer and employee payroll taxes paid out for the corresponding
job. Finally, the data include several employer level variables: industrial sector, geographical
8location, total number of employees in the rm, as well as an employer (scrambled) identier to
link across databases. The longitudinal structure of the database allow us to link earnings and
employers of each individual across the time periods March 2004, March 2005, March 2006, and
March 2007.
For most of our analysis, we create data at the individual level. For individuals with multiple
employers, we dene the main employer as the employer for which regular earnings are highest.
We limit our sample to individuals with Greek nationality (95% of workers in our sample
are Greek nationals) because foreign citizens in our initial sample have very unbalanced dates of
entry concentrated in the later period of our data as foreign workers are primarily immigrants
from Eastern Europe.
Table 2 reports summary statistics, as of March 2007, for four groups of workers with positive
IKA earnings in March 2007: (1) Those entering IKA from 1988 to 1992, i.e., old regime workers,
(2) those entering IKA from 1993 to 1997, i.e., new regime workers, (3) those entering IKA from
1988 to 1992 with March 2007 earnings above ¤2315 (the old regime cap), (4) those entering
IKA from 1993 to 1997 with March 2007 earnings above ¤2315 (the old regime cap). Several
points are worth noting.
First, virtually all the old entrants are in the old regime as expected. About 95% of new
entrants are in the new regime. The number is not 100% because individuals who had covered
earnings in any insurance scheme (not necessarily IKA) before 1993 qualify for the old regime.
As we shall see, this does not invalidate the analysis as entering IKA after 1992 is still a very
strong predictor of regime status and hence marginal payroll tax rates.
Second, about 9% of all workers have earnings above the old cap (¤2315), while only about
1% of all workers have earnings above the new cap (¤5280). As shown in the table, the fraction
of workers above the old cap is higher for old entrants because old entrants are older and have
longer work experience, and hence higher earnings. The same is true for the fraction of workers
above the new cap.
Third, workers above the old cap are more likely to have bonuses, more likely to be male,
more likely to work in larger companies, and less likely to have changed employers from March
2006 to March 2007. None of those of results are surprising.
Finally, the bottom rows of Table 2 show that new entrants face higher marginal payroll tax
rates on average. The dierence becomes especially large when looking at workers above the
9old cap. This is not surprising as old entrants above the old cap by denition should face no
marginal payroll tax11 while most new entrants above the old cap are still below the new cap
and hence face the full marginal payroll tax rates. As shown in the table, the dierence in the
total combined marginal tax rate between old and new entrants above the old cap is almost 25
percentage points.
2.3 Conceptual Framework
We will use three denitions of monthly earnings. First, gross earnings z are dened as earnings
inclusive of employee and employer payroll taxes. Gross earnings can be interpreted as the
total labor cost that employers pay for a given individual.12 Second, posted earnings w are
dened as gross earnings net of employer payroll taxes. In Greece, as in most other countries,
payroll taxes are based on monthly posted earnings w. Earnings include not only the regular
wages and salaries but also overtime pay, bonuses, as well as pay in arrears. It is therefore a
broad denition of cash employment income which is used as the reference for computing payroll
taxes and is also the standard reference for employer-employee compensation negotiations and
decisions. Third, net earnings c are dened as earnings net of employee payroll taxes. This
is the amount of disposable income (before individual income taxes however) that the worker
actually receives.13
We denote by R and E the employer and employee (respectively) marginal payroll tax
rates. As described above, those marginal tax rates apply up to a threshold of earnings  w,
which we call the cap. We denote by  wO the cap in the old regime (for pre-1993 entrants) and
by  wN the cap in the new regime (for those entering after January 1st, 1993). As of 2007, we
have  wO = 2;315 and  wN = 2:28   wO = 5;280.
As c = (1   E)w = [(1   E)=(1 + R)]z = [1   (R + E)=(1 + R)]z, the combination of
employer and employee payroll taxes are equivalent to a combined tax rate  = (R+E)=(1+R)
up to a threshold of gross earnings  z =  w  (1 + E). In Greece, the most common rates are
11The rates are not exactly zero because of workers with multiple employers.
12The total exact labor cost might be slightly higher if employers oer additional fringe benets. However,
because the social security system is generous, such fringe benets are rare in Greece.
13As mentioned above, individual income taxes are withheld at source as well so that take-home pay is
c0 = c T(c) where T(:) represents the withholding schedule for the income tax. Because the individual income
tax applies uniformly across cohorts with no dierentiation between old and new entrants, we do not need to
incorporate the individual income tax in our analysis.
10R = 28% and E = 16% for a combined rate  = 34:4%.14 We denote by  zO and  zN the old
and new cap in terms of gross earnings. Similarly, we denote by  cO and  cN the old and new cap
in terms of net earnings.
 Fixed labor supply
We start with a model with no labor supply responses where individuals dier by skill n.
Under perfect competition and assuming a general production function which is a function of
the each (xed) supply of skill, gross earnings for a given skill should be equal to the marginal
productivity of that skill. The distribution of marginal products across workers comes from
the combination of the general production function and the xed supply of each skill and is
therefore independent of the payroll tax system.
Workers who entered shortly before Jan 1st, 1993 versus shortly after Jan 1st, 1993 should
be very close substitutes in the labor market as they should have very similar characteristics
in terms of age, gender, education, and work experience. Therefore, in a frictionless labor
market, an employer maximizing prots should not be willing to pay more for a new regime
worker than for an old regime worker with identical characteristics and hence identical marginal
productivity. This implies that the tax dierential between new regime and old regime workers
should be borne entirely by workers: gross earnings should be the same for both types of workers.
This implies that posted earnings should be lower for new regime workers above the old cap by
the amount of the extra employer payroll taxes. Similarly, net earnings for new regime workers
above the old cap should be lower by the amount of extra employer plus employee payroll taxes.
 Variable labor supply
The simplest extension of our initial model is to assume that labor supply responds to
marginal incentives. This model can be formally obtained by assuming that the individual
with skill n maximize a utility function un(c;z) where c = z   T(z) is disposable income, z is
gross earnings, and T(z) is total employer plus employee payroll taxes. The utility function un
is increasing in c and decreasing in z (as labor supply is costly). As depicted on Figure 1, a
cap on payroll taxes eectively introduces a (concave) kink in the budget constraint set of the
individual.
14There is variation in rates based on industry and occupation, primarily due to dierences between hazardous
vs. non hazardous occupations.
11Figure 1 plots the budget constraints under the new and old regimes in the standard (z;c)
diagram. The standard labor supply model makes three predictions about the eect of the
reform on labor supply depending on gross earnings levels. (1) New regime workers with gross
earnings below  zO are not aected by the regime change. (2) New regime workers with gross
earnings between  zO and  zN experience an increase in marginal payroll tax rates from 0 to  so
that their net-of-tax rate decreases from one to 1   . This will create primarily a substitution
eect which will reduce gross earnings. There is pure substitution eect at z =  zO and the
income eect grows with z. (3) New regime workers with gross earnings above  zN experience
a pure income eect with no change in net-of-tax rates. This income eect should lead to an
increase in earnings, under the standard assumption that leisure is a normal good. Our data
on 1988-1997 entrants shows that the bottom 90% earners are below  zO and hence not aected
by the reform. Only a very small fraction of workers (the top percentile) are above the new cap
 zN.
Therefore, controlling for date of entry, the distribution of gross earnings (labor costs) for
post-reform entrants should be identical to the distribution of gross earnings for pre-reform
entrants below the old cap, i.e., in the bottom 90% or so of the distribution. Between the old
and new cap, i.e., in the top 10% but excluding the top percentile, labor supply responses should
reduce gross earnings of post-reform entrants (relative to pre-reform entrants). Above the new
cap, i.e. in the top percentile, labor supply responses should increase gross earnings of post
reform entrants. Therefore, empirically, we will examine how the distribution of gross earnings,
posted earnings, and net earnings vary by date of entry.
Note nally that the reform might also generate responses along the extensive margin. The
increase in taxes for new entrants after 1993 might induce some workers to pursue alternative
careers outside the IKA covered sector such as becoming self-employed or even migrating for a
foreign country. This extensive margin should reduce the fraction of high income earners among
new regime workers (relative to old regime workers), which is a hypothesis we will test.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Estimation Design
As the 1992 reform is based on date of entry in the insurance system, our empirical analysis
will be based on comparing current labor market outcomes based on date of entry into the
12IKA system. The reform creates a sharp discontinuity by date of entry with January 1st, 1993
being the dividing line. Because earnings and other characteristics vary by date of entry, for
example older entrants have higher earnings because of higher experience and seniority as shown
in Table 2, we cannot directly compare old and new entrants. However, absent the 1992 reform,
we should expect dierences between old and new entrants to shrink as we compare entrants just
before and just after the cut-o line. This feature leads naturally to a Regression Discontinuity
Design (RDD). We will identify eects by running regressions of the form:










i  1(ti  0) + Xi + "i; (1)
where ti is the entry date of individual i normalized so that t = 0 at the cut-o line of January
1st, 1993 and Xi denotes a vector of additional control variables. The coecient of interest
capturing the eect of the discontinuity at t = 0 is 0 (as the polynomials in tk are zero at
t = 0). Polynomials in t are included to control in a exible way for the eect of date of entry
t on outcome Y . There are two main ways to assess robustness of the RDD results to the
specication: (1) restrict the sample to a narrower window around the cut-o date, which we
will do by limiting the sample to 1991-1994 entrants (instead of 1988-1997 entrants), (2) include
higher order polynomials (the parameter K) in the regression specication. In some cases, we
combine observations from all four waves of March 2004, March 2005, March 2006, March 2007
data in our regression. In that case, we always cluster standard errors at the individual worker
level.
A simple way to illustrate the RDD is to plot average outcome Y by date of entry month
bins and draw the quadratic t below and above the cut-o line. Because of strong seasonal
eects in entry date (due to the annual periodicity of the job market), we shall see that graphs
based on annual date of entry are often more useful than monthly graphs to uncover eects.
The graphical evidence will then guide the formal regression analysis.
3.2 First Stage and Identication Checks
Panel A on Figure 2 plots the fraction of March 2007 workers in the new regime by month
of entry in the IKA insurance scheme. Unsurprisingly, there is an enormous discontinuity as
hardly any worker entering IKA before 1/1/1993 is in the new regime and about 95% of workers
entering IKA on or after 1/1/1993 are in the new regime. As mentioned above, the number is
13not 100% because post reform IKA entrants may have made contributions to another insurance
scheme before 1993, in which case they qualify for the old regime. Panel B in Figure 2 plots the
fraction of workers (as of March 2007) above the earnings cap (¤2315 for old regime workers and
¤5280 for new regime workers). The graph shows indeed a sharp discontinuity at the cut-o
date showing that the fraction above the cap drops from about 8% down to 2% exactly at the
discontinuity, reecting the fact that most post reform entrants are in the new regime with the
much higher cap. The fraction above the cap decreases smoothly by date of entry both among
the old and new entrants because average earnings increase with age and experience as we shall
see. Figure 2 demonstrates that the cohort based reform does create a very strong rst stage
eect on the probability of facing payroll taxes at the margin.
As mentioned earlier, a key requirement for identication is that the workers entering just
before and just after the cut-o dates are comparable. This identication requirement could
be invalidated if some workers had strategically selected their date of entry in response to the
reform. Therefore, Figure 3 plots the number of workers by month of entry. Panel A focuses on
the sample of all IKA workers with positive earnings as of March 2007 while Panel B focuses
of the narrower sample of all IKA workers with earnings above the old cap (¤2315) in March
2007.
The graphs show large month to month variations in the number of entrants due in part to
seasonality eects. Importantly, the quadratic t curves show that there is no discontinuity in
the number of entrants around the cut-o date. Specically, we observe no spike in the number
of entrants just before the cut-o date. This implies that individuals did not try to game the
system by rushing into IKA covered jobs just after the law was passed in late 1992 and before
January 1st, 1993 to benet from the more advantageous old regime. There are three possible
explanations for the absence of gaming eects. First, there was very little time between the
time the law was enacted in late 1992 and January 1st, 1993. Second, formal IKA covered jobs
cannot easily be found or created,15 especially since by late 1992 the Greek economy had dipped
into recession. Third, the dierence between the two regimes might not have loomed large for
young workers as they are very far from retirement to care about changes in retirement benets
and, at the very start of their career, their earnings are almost always below the old cap making
the dierence in caps irrelevant for a number of years. The absence of gaming is critical for our
15In contrast to the United States, most part-time and low paid jobs for teenage workers in Greece are not in
the covered sector and hence do not qualify workers for the old regime status.
14subsequent analysis as gaming could have created a discontinuity in the composition of workers
just below and just above the cut-o, and hence could have invalidated the RDD estimation.
The fact that we do not observe a discontinuity in Panel B, among highly paid workers,
suggests that highly educated workers with high pay expectancy did not respond to the reform
along the extensive margin by choosing to move to other sectors of activity outside IKA such
as the self-employed or even migrating to another country, a point to which we will come back
later on.
Figure 4 provides further identication checks by ploting the fraction male (Panel A) and
the average age (Panel B) by month of entry. The fraction male was slightly above 50% for the
early entry years and falls to slightly below 50% in in the late entry years. Unsurprisingly, the
average age falls by date of entry. Most importantly however, in both cases, the graphs show
that there is no discontinuity at the cut-o line supporting our hypothesis that entrants just
before and just after the cut-o date are comparable.
Those rst stage eects and the absence of eects along those other dimensions are for-
mally estimated in a regression framework and presented in Table 3. The table displays the
coecients (with standard errors in parentheses) from regressing various outcomes (listed in
the left-hand-side column) on a dummy for entering IKA on or after 1/1/1993. The sample
includes all entrants with positive monthly earnings in March 2007.16 Each row focuses on a
specic outcome. Each column corresponds to variations in the RDD specication. Column
(1) estimates includes a linear entry date (normalized to 0 at 1/1/1993) and a linear entry
date interacted with the dummy for entering IKA after 1/1/1993. Column (2) uses the same
controls as column (1) but limits the sample to those entering IKA from 1991 to 1994. Col-
umn (3-5) use all 1988-1997 entrants but add successively Monthly dummies (col. 3), quadratic
date trends (quadratic term and quadratic term interacted with the dummy for entering IKA
after 1/1/1993), cubic date trends (cubic term and cubic term interacted with the dummy for
entering IKA after 1/1/1993). Total MTR is the combined marginal payroll tax rate adding
employee and employer payroll tax rates. The marginal tax rate is zero when the individual
worker is above cap. Two points should be noted.
First, the rst stage results in terms of (a) percent in new regime, (b) percent reaching the
cap (of their respective regime), (c) average marginal tax rate (among all workers) all display a
16Results are very similar in the other March 2004, March 2005, or March 2006 samples and omitted for sake
of space.
15very signicant discontinuity that is very robust for the various specications such as restricting
the sample to 1991-1994 or the number of polynomials date of entry controls included in the
regression. Those results conrm the graphical results from Figure 2 showing that the Greek
payroll tax reform did generate a very strong rst stage eect. Second and in contrast, none of
the identication checks variables displays robustly signicant results. A variable may sometimes
be signicant in one specication but the result is not robust to alternative specications.
Therefore, those regression results also conrms our previous graphical analysis showing that
the 1992 reform does not create discontinuities in the composition of the workforce around the
reform cut-o date. Based on those results, we now turn to the second stage eects on earnings
outcomes.
3.3 Eects on Earnings
3.3.1 Eects on Average Earnings above Old Cap
We now turn to the earnings results. Motivated by our theoretical framework, we should
expect to nd the strongest eects on the distribution of earnings between the old cap and new
cap. Therefore, perhaps the most natural measure to look at is average earnings above the
old cap but capping earnings at the new cap. In the case of earnings, we therefore consider
the variable min(w;  wN) where  wN is the new cap. In the case of gross earnings, we consider
the variable min(z;  zN) where  zN =  wN  (1 + R) is the new cap in gross earnings. Similarly,
in the case of net earnings, we consider the variable min(c; cN) where  cN =  wN  (1   E).
Average gross earnings (resp. earnings, net earnings) above the old cap but capping earnings
at the new cap are therefore dened as E[min(z;  zN)jz   zO], (resp. E[min(w;  wN)jw   wO],
E[min(c; cN)jc   cO]). Our theoretical prediction from the standard model is that, if there are
no labor supply responses, there should be no discontinuity for E[min(z;  zN)jz   zO] at the
date of entry cut-o, and that E[min(w;  wN)jw   wO] and E[min(c; cN)jc   cO] should fall
at the date of entry cut-o because of the mechanical increase in payroll taxes. If there are
labor supply responses, then E[min(z;  zN)jz   zO] should fall at the date of entry cut-o (and
E[min(w;  wN)jw   wO] and E[min(c; cN)jc   cO] should fall even more).
Figure 5, Panel A displays average monthly gross earnings (capped at the new cap as dis-
cussed above) for workers with earnings above the old cap by month of entry into IKA. To
increase the precision of our estimates, we have pooled together earnings data from March
162004, March 2005, March 2006, and March 2007. We inate earnings for earlier years by 4% per
year so that caps align exactly across the 4 waves (as both the old and new cap were adjusted
upward by 4% each year from 2004 to 2007 to account for nominal wage growth). The cloud
of dots and especially the quadratic t curves show a very clear upward discontinuity in gross
earnings around the cut-o line. In contrast to the theoretical prediction, gross earnings jump
up for new regime employees.
Panel B on Figure 5 shifts to plots by year of entry{instead of month of entry{to reduce the
number of dots and the underlying noise in the time series. The annual plots visually conrm
the ndings of Panel A that gross earnings jump up around the cut-o entry date. Post-reform
entrants receive higher gross earnings than pre-reform entrants. Note that by far the biggest
jump in the annual series occurs from 1992 to 1993 as the series is fairly stable in all other
years, providing compelling evidence that the change in tax regime had a positive impact on
gross earnings among high earners aected by the tax reform.
Figure 6, Panel A, displays simultaneously average gross earnings (already displayed on
Figure 5, Panel B), average posted earnings, and average net earnings (always capped at the
new cap) for individuals with earnings above the old cap. Formally, each of those three statistics
are dened as E[min(z;  zN)jz   zO], E[min(w;  wN)jw   wO], and E[min(c; cN)jc   cO]. As we
saw earlier, gross earnings increase at the cut-o date. However, there is no visible discontinuity
in posted earnings. Finally, net earnings display a clear drop at the cut-o date. For all three
series, the graphical evidence appears pretty precise as series are stable and smooth, except at
the cut-o date. Panel B oers a \placebo" test by considering average gross earnings, posted
earnings, and net earnings for the sample of individuals with earnings above ¤1500 and capping
gross earnings, posted earnings, and net earnings at the old caps  zO = (1+E)  wO,  wO = 2315,
and  cO respectively. This is a placebo because, in principle, there should be no discontinuity
eects as individuals below the old cap are not aected by the 1992 reform. Indeed, the graph
conrms that there is no visible discontinuity at the cut-o date as all three series are smooth
and stable over the full period including around the cut-o date.
The graphical evidence displayed on Figures 5 and 6 oers striking evidence of the key point
we will make in this paper. In sharp contrast to the standard model we developed above and
which predicts that new regime entrants should bear the full (employee plus employer) payroll
tax dierential, we nd that employers compensate new regime entrants for the extra employer
17payroll taxes so that gross earnings are higher for new entrants and posted earnings are actually
the same for new and old entrants. In contrast, employees seem to bear the full burden of
the extra employee payroll taxes so that net earnings are lower for new entrants. All standard
theoretical models predict that the division between employer and employee payroll taxes should
not matter for the ultimate incidence of the payroll taxes between employees and employers. The
unusual cohort based Greek reform oers clear evidence contradicting this clear-cut prediction
of the standard model.
Table 4 presents the RDD estimates corresponding to the graphical evidence displayed on
Figures 5 and 6 using the same ve RDD specications used in the earlier Table 3. Panel
A focuses on total earnings (as in Figures 5 and 6) while Panel B focuses solely on regular
earnings (i.e., base salary excluding overtime, bonuses, and other special payments). Panel C
considers the \placebo" experiment (as in Figure 6, Panel B) using the sample of individuals
with earnings above ¤1500 and capping gross earnings, earnings, and net earnings at the old
caps  zO = (1 + E)   wO,  wO = 2315, and  cO respectively.
The table conrms the graphical results. First, in all specications, we nd a positive and
signicant eect for gross earnings. Gross earnings jump by about ¤100-140 at the discontinuity
and the coecients are precisely estimated with large t-statistics. Second, we nd a small and
always insignicant result for posted earnings. Third, we nd a negative and signicant eect for
net earnings. Net earnings jump down by about ¤70-100 at the discontinuity, with signicant
t-statistics is all specications. Fourth, as shown on Panel B, the results are pretty similar when
considering only regular earnings (base salary) instead of full earnings. This shows that the non-
standard result is primarily due to base salary determination rather than additional earnings
(overtime, bonuses, etc.). Finally, the placebo regressions consistently deliver very small and
almost always insignicant results. This successfully shows that there is no discontinuity in
earnings policies (gross earnings, earnings, or net earnings) at the cut-o entry dates below
the old cap. Those negative placebo results can be seen as an additional identication check
suggesting that there is no composition eect among workers around the cut-o entry date.
Taken together, Table 4 oers compelling conrmation of our earlier graphical results and show
that, for new entrants, employers bear the incidence of the extra employer payroll tax but that
employees bear the incidence of the extra employee payroll tax.
183.3.2 Eects on Fraction of Workers with High Earnings
Instead of considering average earnings statistics, we now consider an alternative statistic,
namely the fraction of workers with gross earnings, posted earnings, or net earnings above
given xed thresholds z;w;c. From our theoretical framework, we expect this fraction to be
continuous at the cut-o date if z is below the old cap. This fraction should be stable for gross
earnings z, go down for w and c if z (resp. w, c) is between the old and new caps and there
are no labor supply responses. With labor supply responses, this fraction should also go down
for gross earnings z.
Figure 7, Panel A displays, by year of entry in IKA, the fraction of workers with gross
earnings, posted earnings, and net earnings above z = 3000  (1 + R), w = 3000, and c =
3000  (1   E) as of March 2007. The cut-o ¤3000 is chosen so as to fall in between the old
and new caps. Unsurprisingly, the fraction of high earners is declining with date of entry as
older entrants have more experience and hence higher earnings as we documented in Table 2.
The striking nding however is that this declining pattern does not happen for gross earnings
around the cut-o date: the fraction with high gross earnings is virtually the same in 1993 as in
1992. For posted earnings, the series are smoothly declining with no visible discontinuity. For
net earnings, the decline is actually more pronounced from 1992 to 1993. Those ndings are
fully consistent with our previous ndings showing that gross earnings (resp. posted earnings,
net earnings) are actually higher (resp. the same, lower) for new entrants than for old entrants
around the cut-o.
Panel B oers a placebo test by displaying the fraction of workers with gross earnings, posted
earnings, and net earnings above z = 2000  (1 + R), w = 2000, and c = 2000  (1   E) as
of March 2007. The cut-o ¤2000 is chosen so as to fall below the old cap. In principle,
there should be no eect because the regime change does not aect taxes below the old cap as
we discussed earlier. In that case, the series indeed do not display any discontinuity in their
downward trend by date of entry around the cut-o date, providing a successful placebo check.
Table 5 presents RDD estimates based on those alternative earnings outcomes. Panel A
estimates are for total earnings while Panel B estimates are for regular earnings (dened as
base pay excluding bonuses, overtime, and other special payments). Based on the extensive
robustness analysis with respect to RDD specication presented in Table 3 and 4, in Table 5,
19we limit ourselves to 2 specications corresponding to columns (1) and (2) in Table 4: all entrants
with linear trend controls and 1991-1994 entrants only with linear trend controls. Columns (1)
to (3) are estimated based on all entrants and columns (4) to (6) are estimated based on the
sample of 1991-1994 entrants only. Columns (1) and (4) are for gross earnings, columns (2)
and (5) for posted earnings, and columns (3) and (6) for net earnings. The table shows that
other outcomes above the old cap, such as the fraction of individuals above 3000 Euros (or
5000 Euros) follows the same pattern as we obtained above: there is an upward discontinuity
for gross earnings, no robust discontinuity for earnings, and a downward discontinuity for net
earnings. As our graphical evidence showed, we nd no eects in the placebo case where we
consider the fraction of workers above 2000 Euros.
3.3.3 Eects on earnings across subgroups
 Eects by Age at Entry
Figure 8 focuses on heterogeneity by age at entry. Both panels display, by year of entry in
IKA, the average monthly gross earnings, posted earnings, and net earnings, capped at the new
cap, for all workers above the old cap (as in Figure 5). Panel A is for workers aged 27 or less when
they entered IKA while Panel B is for workers aged over 27 when they entered IKA. The two
panels display a striking heterogeneity in payroll tax incidence. Young workers display the same
non-standard incidence results as the full sample: at the cut-o entry date, gross earnings jump
up, posted earnings are stable, while net earnings jump down. In contrast, for older workers,
gross earnings are stable at the discontinuity, posted earnings jump down, and net earnings
jump down even more. Therefore, older workers display tax incidence results consistent with
the standard model whereby employers do not compensate new regime workers for employer
payroll taxes, and hence workers bear the full burden of both employee and employer payroll
taxes.
Panel A of Table 6 conrms the graphical results. Table 6 is built exactly along the model
of Table 5. It shows eects for gross earnings, posted earnings, and net earnings for two
RDD specications (the full 1988-1997 sample and the restricted 1991-1994 sample both with
linear controls in date of entry) across 6 columns. For older workers, gross earnings do not
display any signicant change at the discontinuity while earnings and especially net earnings
fall discontinuously. Note that the estimates are not as precise as in the full sample because old
20workers constitute only about 15% of all workers.17
Those results suggest that employers are more likely to pass on older workers the extra cost
of payroll taxes for highly paid new regime workers than for younger workers. Those age based
estimates were carried out because of the ndings we obtained from our informal survey of
employers discussed in Section 4.1. Therefore, we will discuss at length the interpretation of
those aged based results in Section 4.
 Eects by Gender
We estimate incidence eects on total earnings by gender in Table 6, Panel B. The results
show that the RDD eect on gross earnings, posted earnings, and net earnings are about the
same for men and women, and display in both cases the same non-standard incidence eects
that we have found in the full sample. Those results imply that the inability or unwillingness of
employers to pass on new regime highly paid workers the extra cost of payroll taxes is equally
present for men and women.
 Eects by Size of Firms
It is conceivable that small rms have less formal compensation policies and perhaps less
Union pressure and hence more exibility to adjust pay based on the specic situation of the
employee, and in particular the tax regime of the employee. We present estimates by size of
rms in Table 6, Panel C. The estimates are very close across small and large rms. Those
results imply that the inability or unwillingness of employers to pass on new regime highly paid
workers the extra cost of payroll taxes is equally present in large and small rms.18
3.4 Other Eects: Labor Supply, Turnover, and Pay Increases
3.4.1 Labor Supply
We discussed in Section 2.3 the expected eects of the reform on labor supply under a standard
incidence scenario. Our empirical results show instead that incidence is non-standard because
new regime workers bear only the employee portion of the extra payroll taxes. However, our
results show that new regime workers still bear the cost of the employee portion of the payroll
tax, which adds a marginal tax wedge of 16% for high income earners (as shown on Table 1).
17This explains why the full sample generates results very similar to young workers. The standard incidence
results is concentrated primarily among the 15% oldest workers, explaining why we chose the 27 age cut-o.
18We have experimented with dierent cuts by size of rm. We nd that incidence results are similar across
all rm's sizes.
21Therefore, it is conceivable that the extra employee tax rate could aect labor supply decisions
of new regime high income earners.
Our data allow us to study labor supply decisions along several dimensions: days of work per
month, overtime, full day vs. part day, bonuses, and multiple jobs. Because the administrative
data have such rich labor supply variables, we construct monthly hours of work as follows. In
Greece, a full day implies eight hours of work. Part day would be anything below eight hours.
As the most common part day is half day, we assume that part day corresponds to four hours
of work. We assume that overtime corresponds to additional hours of work over and above the
regular hours. We compute the hours of work corresponding to overtime by assuming that the
hourly wage rate in overtime is the same as in regular time. Finally, we cap monthly hours
of work at 300 per month (less than one percent of the sample hits this cap). Our measure
of hours of work certainly has some measurement error but signicant measurement error in
hours is also present in self-reported survey data. More importantly, our measure of marginal
tax rates which is relevant for labor supply estimation is not aected by the measurement error
in hours as marginal tax rates are based on total earnings which have very little measurement
error.
We select our sample as follows. First, we compute the daily regular earnings by dividing
regular monthly earnings by the number of days of work in the month. Recall that regular
earnings include only base pay and do not include bonuses, overtime, and other special payments.
Second, we select workers with daily regular earnings above ¤2500/25 = 100. We select this cut-
o because IKA assumes that full time workers have 25 insurance days per month. Therefore,
those workers will be above the old cap by working the average number of days just with
regular earnings, and hence there will be discontinuity in marginal tax rates for additional days,
overtime, or bonuses. We also select a placebo group of medium earning workers with regular
daily earnings between 1500/25 and 2000/25 Euros. Regular earnings put those workers below
the old cap and therefore they face no discontinuity in marginal tax rates at the cut-o date
1/1/1993.
Figure 9, Panel A displays the average number of monthly hours of work in the regular job
among high earners (treatment group) and among medium earners (control group) that we just
dened. For both groups, the number of hours of work displays a small downward trend by date
of entry. Note that the scale is very compressed as most workers work a standard 200 hours
22(=25 days times 8 hours) per month. Most importantly, there is no discontinuity from 1992
to 1993 for either group, suggesting that high earners do not respond to the higher rates by
cutting their number of hours of work, in spite of bearing the burden of the additional employee
marginal payroll tax.
Figure 9, Panel B displays the fraction of workers with overtime among high earners (treat-
ment group) and among medium earners (control group). Overtime is much more common
among medium earners (about 20%) than among high earners (5%). Most important, however,
there is no evidence of discontinuity from 1992 to 1993 suggesting that high earners do not
respond to the higher employee tax rates by reducing overtime.
Table 7, Panel A provides regression estimates of labor supply eects. Table 7 is built exactly
along the model of Table 4. It shows eects for various labor supply outcomes using ve RDD
specications across 5 columns with dierent set of controls. The rst two rows show indeed
that there is no discontinuity is days in regular job and overtime at the cut-o dates: virtually
all estimates are insignicant. Table 7, Panel A presents results for two additional outcomes:
percent with bonus and percent with multiple jobs. Those two outcomes do not display any
signicant eect at the cut-o date showing that there is no labor supply response along the
bonus19 or multiple job decisions.
Finally, the bottom of Panel A focuses on the standard hours of work measure. Consistent
with our graphical ndings on Figure 9A, the rst row shows no signicant discontinuity in
hours of work at the cut-o date (and the standard errors rule out eects larger than 2 hours
relative to a base of 200 hours per month on average). The second row (in bold) estimates
the elasticity of hours of work with respect to the net-of-employee payroll tax rate. We regress
log-hours on log(1   E) where E is the marginal employee payroll tax rate, instrumenting
log(1   E) with a dummy for entering IKA in 1993 or after, and using additional controls as
in the other estimates. This specication is based on our previous nding that new regime
workers bear only the employee portion of payroll taxes. The key identication assumption is
that, absent the reform, workers on each side of the cut-o date would supply the same number
of hours of work. All our elasticity estimates are insignicant and very close to zeros implying
that hours of work do not respond to marginal tax rates.
Therefore, we are not able to detect any labor supply eects of higher employee marginal
19Labor supply aects bonuses paid for individual performance. In some cases however, bonuses are based on
collective performance. Individual labor supply has only a minor impact on collective bonuses.
23payroll tax rates. Our results show that the labor supply of upper income earners (about the top
decile) aected by the discontinuity is fairly inelastic to payroll tax rates, even in the long-run
as the discontinuity has been in place since 1993 and we observe earnings from 2004 to 2007,
more than 10 years later. Perhaps even more importantly, our results show there is not much
earnings manipulation taking place to avoid taxes (such as having new regime workers paid
with deferred compensation or perks on the job instead of cash) as earnings of upper earners
do not display any discontinuity at the cut-o date. Those results suggest that the high payroll
tax rates in Greece (as in most European countries) may not have very large eciency costs on
high income earners.
3.4.2 Turnover
We now use the longitudinal structure of the data to analyze turnover eects. We dene year
to year turnover as changing the main employer from March of year t to March of year t + 1,
where the main employer is the employer paying regular earnings (the highest regular earnings
when a worker has multiple regular employers in a given month).
Figure 10, Panel A, displays, by year of entry in IKA, the fraction of workers changing jobs
from one year to the next for two groups of workers: (1) high earners (those with earnings
above the old cap and hence who are aected by the reform and called the treatment group),
(2) medium earners (those with earnings between ¤1500 Euros and the old cap and hence not
aected by the reform and called the control group). The series display a fairly sharp upward
discontinuity in the treatment group but not in the control group suggesting that the higher
tax rates do lead to higher turnover. Panel B in Table 7 conrms that there is a signicant 1-2
percentage point increase (from a base of 15-20%) in turnover at the discontinuity although it
should be pointed out that the estimates are not always statistically signicant and hence not
as clear and strong as the eects on earnings we uncovered earlier.
Because new regime workers receive the same earnings as old regime workers around the
discontinuity, we suspect that higher turnover comes primarily from employers' decisions. Em-
ployers may prefer to lay o or let go of new regime workers rst as new regime workers might
generate a smaller surplus for the employer due to the extra taxes. This is also likely to happen
if the employer does not observe regime status at the time of hiring. We will come back to those
points in Section 4. Importantly, however, in the long-run, employer driven extra turnover
24should lead to smaller earnings for new regime workers. The fact that we do not observe a dis-
continuity in cross sectional earnings (Figures 6 and 7 and Tables 4 and 5) more than 10 years
after the reform suggests that those turnover eects are not strong enough to aect earnings
signicantly.
3.4.3 Pay Increases
Finally, we turn to the analysis of year to year increases in monthly nominal regular earnings
using also the longitudinal structure of the data. We use regular earnings as this corresponds
to the base salary is much more stable from year to year than total earnings. Figure 10, Panel
B displays, by year of entry in IKA, the fraction of workers experiencing a nominal regular
earnings (resp. gross earnings, net earnings) increase the following year for workers with regular
earnings above the old cap in base year. Panel B displays a clear downward discontinuity
for gross earnings, no discontinuity for posted earnings, and an upward discontinuity for net
earnings. In other words and relative to old regime workers, new regime workers are less likely
to receive a gross regular earnings nominal raise, as likely to receive a regular posted earnings
nominal raise, and more likely to receive a net regular earnings nominal raise. Panel C in Table
7 conrms those results across all RDD specications.
Those results are fully consistent with our previous results and can be explained as follows.
For a worker in the new regime and above the old cap (and below the new cap), no nominal
posted earnings change implies no nominal gross earnings and net earnings change as employer
and employee payroll taxes are proportional to earnings. In contrast, for a worker in the old
regime, no nominal posted earnings change implies that (1) gross earnings are increasing as the
old cap increases by 4% from year to year and hence employer payroll taxes increase correspond-
ingly,20 (2) net earnings are decreasing as employee payroll taxes also increase correspondingly.
Hence, if employers keep nominal posted earnings xed from year to year for a fraction of their
employees, the pattern from Figure 10, Panel B naturally arises. The important lesson from
those results is that employers seem to base (nominal) pay increase decisions on posted earnings
(not gross earnings or net earnings).21 As a result, the discontinuity in taxes at the cut-o
date generates a discontinuity in gross and net earnings but not for earnings. Those results are
20This is strictly true if nominal posted earnings are above the old cap in year t+1, equal to 1.04 the old cap
in year t.
21Collective agreements in Greece always set pay rates in terms of posted earnings (Matsaganis, 2007).
25entirely consistent with our initial incidence results on earnings.
4 Interpretation
4.1 Evidence from a Survey of Employers
To understand the mechanism behind our non-standard incidence results, we carried out a small
informal survey of ve managers involved in personnel decisions at rms of medium to large size.
Those managers were talking and providing perspective on behalf of employers, and hence we
will refer to them as \employers". We also interviewed one union manager specializing on social
security issues. Each of those six interviewees was asked a set of questions on knowledge of
employers about the new vs. old tax regime and regime status of prospective recruits. Then we
asked whether tax status matters to employers when making recruitment decisions and salaries
oers, when oering pay raises to existing employees, or for lay-o decisions. If told that regime
status does not aect those personnel decisions, we asked managers why this is the case. The
exact formulation of the questions is provided in annex I to the paper.
Four important ndings emerge from this survey. First, all ve employers knew about the
tax dierential between old and new entrants but only two out of ve said that they knew or
asked this information for potential recruits.
Second and related, none of the ve employers said that being in the new regime negatively
aected hiring decisions, salaries oered, or subsequent pay raises or lay-o decisions. As
one employer said \An employee's social insurance regime does not even come to mind when
recruitment, pay, promotion or dismissal decisions are pondered within the rm." This is
consistent with our empirical results showing that salaries (i.e., posted earnings w) are the
same for old and new regime workers. This also explains why only two employers mentioned
asking/knowing about tax regime when making recruiting decisions. In the end, regime status
does not seem like a relevant parameter when making recruiting or compensation decisions.
Only one manager said \Discrimination against new regime workers at the time of recruitment
may arise in theory when two candidates for a job not only are equally qualied but have similar
age too. Clearly, such cases are exceptional."
Third, when we asked why regime status was not relevant for recruiting and compensation
decisions, none of the three reasons we proposed in the questionnaire was seen as very relevant.
26None of the employers said that Union pressure to oer equal salary was relevant. This could
be explained by the fact that Unionization rates in the private sector in Greece are low, around
15% (Matsaganis, 2007) and Unions are even less relevant for highly paid workers above the
old cap for whom the regime change is relevant. As one employer put it: \Since unions are
rather weak in the private sector, wage setting (especially of highly-qualied workers) typically
results from individual agreements and not collective bargaining. The deals struck are usually
expressed in terms of salary [not gross earnings including employer payroll taxes]. Therefore,
any dierence in social contributions due to the higher cap of \new insurees" is absorbed by the
rm." None of the employers said that fear of legal anti-discrimination action was a factor. One
manager said \Fear of litigation cannot explain rms' decisions, since younger workers are often
less aware of their rights and more likely to be bullied by employers into accepting less favorable
terms." The Union manager told us that he was not aware of any action on the part of the
two union confederations he is advising, in defence of younger workers discriminated against by
employers by virtue of their new regime status. Finally, only one employer said that fairness
and morale concerns could explain the equal treatment of new and old regime employees, but
even that point was made as a general statement against any form of discrimination: \Any kind
of discrimination is against company policy. Moreover, it would denitely harm morale at the
rm."
Fourth and perhaps most important, three of the ve employers volunteered the following
explanation, which we did not propose, for the absence of discrimination. Younger workers
are often the most productive workers and yet are paid less because of pay seniority practices.
As a result, young workers are valuable to companies, and that remains the case, even when
factoring in the extra taxes due to the new regime. One manager said \Younger workers are
not only not discriminated against, they are generally preferred because productivity is higher."
Another volunteered \The importance of seniority in wage setting and pay rise decisions is such
that in actual fact younger workers tend to be paid less for the same work than older ones,
even though younger workers are more costly to the rm in terms of payroll costs compared
to older workers at the same level of take-home pay." Finally, one employer mentioned \Since
seniority and/or previous experience (and, sometimes, age) are the main determinants of pay,
younger workers are by denition paid less. This compensates for the possibility of higher social
contributions because of the cap." The Union manager also mentioned \If anything, it may be
27older workers that are discriminated against [in hiring and ring decisions]: on the one hand,
because of seniority they are often paid better - while on the other hand, because of fatigue,
they perform less well." This pay seniority explanation stating that old workers are overpaid
while young workers are underpaid (relative to productivity) is consistent with our empirical
nding from Figure 8: employers are willing to compensate young new regime for the extra
employer payroll taxes but are not willing to compensate older new regime workers for whom
we have found classical incidence.
4.2 An Explanation: Social Norms Regarding Seniority-Based Pay
The general nding that emerges from the informal survey is that employers do not behave as
in the standard model and do not attempt to systematically pass on to new regime workers
the tax dierential. This is indeed consistent with our empirical results. Most importantly,
the survey shows that employers face constraints in their prot maximization behavior that are
not incorporated in the standard model where gross earnings are equated to marginal product.
The survey strongly suggests that the critical constraint is seniority-based pay practices which
require employers to oer pay proles increasing with seniority even though actual productivity
may actually fall with seniority.
There is a large empirical literature in labor economics analyzing whether wage proles are
steeper than productivity proles (see Skirbekk (2004) for a recent survey). The key diculty
in this literature is to measure productivity independently of the wage. The general nding is
that productivity follows an inverted U-shape over a working life while wages tend to increase
continually with age. As a result, younger workers tend to be underpaid while older workers are
over paid relative to productivity, a phenomenon sometimes called the tenure eect. Various
studies have documented such a discrepancy between productivity and pay in various European
countries (see e.g., Haegeland and Klette, 1999 for Norway, Cr epon et al. 2002 for France,
Ilmakunnas et al. 2004 for Finland). Interestingly, earlier studies suggest that such a discrepancy
existed in the United States three decades ago (see e.g., Medo and Abraham, 1980) but seems
to have largely disappeared by the 1990s (Hellerstein, Neumark and Troske, 1999). Conceivably,
the more competitive the labor market, the smaller the tenure eect.
Theoretically, two broad types of explanations have been proposed for this tenure eect.
First, the contract theory literature has proposed various models of long-term wage contracts
28when there is asymmetric information about workers productivity. Deferred wages could be
a screening mechanism to encourage workers to join the rm for the long-term (Salop and
Salop 1976). Deferred wages may deter shirking by raising the costs to a worker of being red
(Lazear, 1981). Finally, deferred wages can be desirable when workers are more risk averse
than employers (Harris and Holmstrom 1982). Second, the behavioral economics literature has
shown that individuals enjoy increasing pay proles relative to at or declining proles with
the same present discounted value (see e.g., Frederick, Loewenstein, and O'Donohue, 2002, and
Clark, Frijters, and Shields, 2008 for recent surveys). In the case of the labor market and using
direct survey evidence, Loewenstein and Sicherman (1991) and Frank and Hutchens (1993) show
that workers prefer increasing wage proles than at or declining proles with higher present
discounted value. Increasing wage proles might be valuable as a forced saving mechanism
(when individuals have self-control problems) or because individuals inherently value the feeling
of getting ahead. Our empirical results and employer survey evidence cannot be easily reconciled
with the contract theory models. Indeed, any of those rational models would imply that the
payroll tax dierential should be fully reected in the long-term contract and hence be borne
entirely by workers. Similarly, the forced saving model would not generate the non-standard
incidence we have uncovered.
A pure fairness model, where workers would not tolerate dierences in earnings due solely
to regime status would explain our incidence results in a partial equilibrium model, as it would
constrain employers to oer equal earnings to identical workers just below and just above the
cut-o entry date. However, such a non-standard incidence could not be sustained in general
equilibrium as employers would try to avoid recruiting new regime workers, or would try to lay
them o in priority, which would generate a discontinuity in earnings around the cut-o date
in equilibrium. Such a model also seems inconsistent with the informal survey of employers. A
model where employers do not observe regime status when they make hiring decisions would
generate exactly the same predictions as the pure fairness model both in partial and general
equilibrium, and hence cannot account for our empirical results either.
To obtain the non-standard incidence results, we propose an explanation based on social
norms regarding seniority-based pay. A social norm reects the preferences of society. It can
inuence prot maximizing businesses through additional constraints on behavior and such
norms are often also supported by specic legislation or by institutions such as Unions. Let us
29assume that there is a social norm that employers need to pay older or tenured workers more,
and that such seniority-based pay norms are based on posted earnings, i.e., posted salary net-of
employer payroll taxes but inclusive of employee payroll taxes (and individual income taxes).
This social norm arises perhaps because workers enjoy the feeling of getting pay rises and might
be enforced partly by Union agreements which require rms to oer pay raises with seniority.
Firms which do not oer such an increasing pay prole may not be able to hire workers in the
rst place, or might get into costly conicts with their workers. Therefore, it is in the best
interest of employers to respect the seniority-based pay norm.
In principle, a prot maximizing rm would want to arbitrage such a norm by hiring young
workers, who are paid less than their marginal product, and laying-o older or tenured workers,
who are paid more than their marginal product. Therefore, there must be additional constraints
preventing rms from laying-o older workers: those constraints can be severance payments
based on tenure. As one manager in our survey pointed out: \Labor shedding is typically done
by \wastage" (i.e. retirement or voluntary departure) rather than by dismissal. Severance pay
is a function of seniority, which means that workers who have been longer with the rm are less
likely to be made redundant, as that would be too costly [to the rm]." Such a constraint may
be another social norm: a rm laying-o workers with longer tenure might get into a conict
with its workforce.
In such a context, hiring a young worker is protable to the rm, even if the young worker is
in the new regime. As a result, rms will always want to hire young workers, regardless of regime
status, when a vacancy arises. In equilibrium, it must be the case that young workers are fully
employed so that it is dicult for rms to nd young workers. Of course, if choosing between
two identical young workers with dierent status, the rm prefers the old regime worker but
those cases are rare as the social norms constraints eectively create rationing of young workers
in the labor market. The salary (i.e., posted earnings w) of young workers is therefore binding
at the social norm constraint, and as a result, for new regime workers, the incidence of extra
employer payroll taxes is borne by employers while the incidence of extra employee payroll taxes
is borne by employees. This model would also explain why employers are not willing to bear the
burden of extra taxes for older new regime workers as those older workers may not be underpaid
to start with.
305 Conclusions
Using a unique cohort based reform of payroll taxes in Greece, our paper has uncovered com-
pelling evidence of non-standard long-run tax incidence. We have found that employers bear
the burden of the employer portion of payroll taxes while employees bear the burden of the
employee portion of payroll taxes. In addition, we do not nd any evidence of labor supply
responses to the higher employee marginal payroll tax rate paid and borne by new regime work-
ers. The informal survey of employers conrms that employers do not try to pass on employees
the extra cost of employer payroll taxes. The view from employers is that the productivity of
young high-skilled workers (who are paid above the old cap) is higher than their wages so that
it remains protable to hire young high-skilled workers in spite of the higher tax costs due to
the tax reform. We have argued that such a reasoning cannot hold in a standard competitive
labor market or even a fully rational contract theory model of the labor market. The most
plausible explanation seems to be the existence of seniority-based pay social norms based on
posted salaries (as opposed to either labor costs or net earnings) which impose constraints on
rms' maximizing behavior. Those norms create a wedge between pay and productivity, and
can explain our empirical ndings, and in particular the fact that incidence reverts to standard
for older workers.
It will be particularly interesting to follow up this cohort based reform in coming decades
as our ndings suggest that the non-standard incidence should progressively disappear with the
aging of workers just above and just below the cut-o. If this ends up being the case, the reform
will allow to estimate precisely the long-run labor supply eects of marginal payroll tax rates as
new and old regime workers around the discontinuity will be facing sharply dierent earnings
incentives at the margin. Our original interest in this Greek reform was precisely to use it to
compellingly estimate long-run responses to marginal tax rates. The discovery of non-standard
incidence made this original goal harder to reach but casts new interesting light on the workings
of the labor market and pay determination.
The existence of such seniority-based pay norms raise interesting public policy issues. If
older workers are paid more than their productivity, rms have incentives to either lay them
o in priority or avoid hiring them, which can lead to high unemployment rates among older
workers, a serious issue indeed in many European countries. The response of governments and
unions has been to introduce ring costs laws, often in the form of severance payments, which
31grow with tenure, to reduce lay-os among older workers, or to oer early retirement benets.
However, ring costs might exacerbate the diculty of older workers in nding jobs in the rst
place, and early retirement benets are very costly to government nances. Many public pension
benets formulas are based on the last years of earnings (instead of full career earnings). This
also creates an incentive for rms and workers to tilt wages proles to increase pension benets
at the expense of government nances.
Based on our evidence, a better government policy response might be to implement employer
payroll tax deductions for older workers. If social norms are based on posted earnings (not
including employer payroll taxes), such payroll tax reductions will be absorbed entirely by
employers with no change in posted earnings for older workers. Indeed, Spain implemented
such a reform in 2002 and Alvaredo and Saez (2010) show that the incidence fell entirely on
employers, in contrast to the standard model, but in accordance with the seniority-based pay
social norm model we have proposed. Another potentially valuable policy would be to change
pension benets formulas so as to base benets not only on the last years of earnings but the
full career, possibly by giving even more weight to early career earnings relative to late career
earnings. We leave for future work the analysis of the optimal design of payroll taxes and
retirement programs in the presence of social norms regarding pay seniority.
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Figure 1. Conceptual Framework 
The figure displays the effects of the 1992 pension reform in Greece on the monthly budget constraint of 
private sector employees (covered by the IKA social insurance system). The x-axis represents monthly 
gross earnings (including both employer and employee payroll taxes). The y-axis represents monthly net 
earnings (earnings net of both employer and employee payroll taxes). The solid line is the old regime 
budget (for those entering the IKA system before 1993) and the dashed line is the new regime budget (for 
those entering the IKA system on or after 1993). The reform increased the cap in earnings subject to payroll 
taxes from zO to zN for new regime workers, hence shifting outward the kink point in the budget set where 
the payroll marginal tax rate ends. In the standard model, workers with monthly earnings below zO are 
unaffected by the reform. Workers with earnings between zO and zN experience a substitution effect which 
decreases gross earnings (and also an income effect but small relative to substitution effects). Workers with 
earnings above zN experience only an income effect which increases gross earnings. 
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Figure 2. First Stage: Fraction in New Regime and above Cap by month of entry 
In both panels, the sample is all workers with positive earnings in the IKA social insurance scheme as of 
March 2007. Panel A displays the fraction of workers in the new regime by month of entry into the IKA 
system. Workers entering IKA before 1993 are all in the old regime. The vast majority of workers entering 
IKA on or after 1993 are in the new regime. Some post-1993 entrants are in old regime because workers 
who had covered earnings before 1993 in any other social insurance scheme (outside IKA) still qualify for 
the old regime. Panel B displays the fraction of workers with earnings above the payroll tax cap. There is a 
sharp drop at the 1/1/1993 cut-off date as the cap for new regime workers is 2.28 times higher than for old 
regime workers. In both panels, the curve on each side of the discontinuity is the best quadratic fit. 
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Figure 3. Identification Checks: Number of Entrants by Month of Entry 
Panel A displays the number of workers by month of entry in the sample of workers with positive earnings 
as of March 2007. Panel B displays the number of workers by month of entry in the sample of workers with 
earnings above the old cap (2315 Euros) in March 2007. In both panels, the curve on each side of the 
discontinuity is the best quadratic fit. Both graphs display no discontinuity at the cut-off date showing that 
workers did not game the system by entering IKA before 1993 when the reform was enacted in late 1992. 
Panel B also shows that highly skilled workers in the new regime did not respond to the higher tax along 
the extensive margin, by dropping out of IKA by migrating to jobs not covered by IKA.  
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Figure 4. Further Identification Checks: Gender and Age Composition 
In both panels, the sample is all workers with positive earnings in the IKA social insurance scheme as of 
March 2007. Panel A displays the fraction of male workers by month of entry in IKA. Panel B displays the 
age of workers (as of March 2007) by month of entry in IKA. In both panels, the curve on each side of the 
discontinuity is the best quadratic fit. Both graphs display no discontinuity at the cut-off date showing that 
there is no systematic difference in observable variables between entrants just above and just below the cut-
off, a requirement for the Regression Discontinuity Design to be valid. Note the strong seasonality effects 
for age my month of entry. 
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Figure 5. Effects on Gross Earnings above Old Cap  
Panel A displays, by month of entry in IKA, the average monthly gross earnings z, capped at the new cap 
zN, for all workers with gross earnings above the old cap zO. Formally, the statistic is defined as 
E(min(z,zN)|z > zO). The series combine earnings records for March 2004, March 2005, March 2006, and 
March 2007. Earnings are adjusted by 4% per year by so that cap levels are aligned. The curve on each side 
of the discontinuity is the best quadratic fit. Panel B repeats the same series but aggregated by year of entry. 
Both panels show a clear upward discontinuity around the cut-off date, which goes opposite to the 
prediction from the standard model presented on Figure 1. 
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Figure 6. Effects on Gross Earnings, Earnings, and Net Earnings above Old Cap  
Panel A displays, by year of entry in IKA, the average gross earnings, posted earnings, and net earnings, 
capped at the new cap, for all workers above the old cap. Formally, the three statistics are defined as 
E(min(z,zN)|z > zO), E(min(w,wN)|w > wO), E(min(c,cN)|c > cO). The graph shows that gross earnings jump 
up (relative to trend) at the cut-off date, posted earnings are continuous, and net earnings jump down, 
consistent with Figure 5. Panel B offers a placebo test by repeating the same series but average earnings 
capped at the old cap for all workers above 1500 Euros. In principle, such statistics should not be affected 
by the reform and indeed the graph confirms that there are no discontinuities in any of the three series at the 
cut-off date. Both panels combine earnings records for March 2004, March 2005, March 2006, and March 
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Figure 7: Fraction with Earnings above Threshold 
Panel A displays, by year of entry in IKA, the fraction of workers with monthly gross earnings, posted 
earnings, and net earnings above 3000*(1+R), 3000, and 3000*(1-E) Euros. The graph shows an upward 
discontinuity for gross earnings, no discontinuity for posted earnings, and a downward discontinuity for net 
earnings, at the cut-off date, consistent with results in Figure 6. Panel B offers a placebo test by displaying 
the fraction of workers with gross earnings, posted earnings, and net earnings above 2000*(1+R), 2000, 
and 2000*(1-E) Euros, which are below the old cap and should not be affected by the reform. Both panels 
combine earnings records for March 2004, March 2005, March 2006, and March 2007 and adjust earnings 
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Figure 8: Heterogeneous Effects on Earnings by Age at Entry 
Both panels display, by year of entry in IKA, the average monthly gross earnings, posted earnings, and net 
earnings, capped at the new cap, for all workers above the old cap (as in Figure 5). Both panels combine 
earnings records for March 2004, March 2005, March 2006, and March 2007. Panel A is for workers aged 
27 or less when they entered IKA. Panel B is for workers aged over 27 when they entered IKA. Panel A 
shows that incidence effects are non standard for young workers (employers compensate workers the extra 
employer tax burden at the discontinuity and gross earnings jump up) while incidence effects are standard 
for older workers (employers do not compensate workers for the extra employer tax burden at the 
discontinuity and gross earnings are flat). Note that 85% of the sample is young explaining why main 
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Figure 9. Labor Supply Effects: Monthly Hours of Work and Overtime 
Panel A displays, by year of entry in IKA, the average number of monthly hours of work among high 
earners (defined as those with regular earnings per day of work above 2500/25 Euros, i.e., would reach the 
old cap by working full month) and among medium earners (defined as those with regular earnings per day 
of work between 1500/25 and 2000/25 Euros, i.e., would remain below the old cap by working full month). 
Panel B displays, by year of entry in IKA, the fraction of workers with overtime earnings among the same 
two groups as in Panel A. The high earner group is affected by the reform while the medium earnings 
group is not. Earnings records for March 2004, March 2005, March 2006, and March 2007 are combined. 
In both panels, there is no discontinuity at the cut-off date for the treatment group, suggesting that there is 
no labor supply response--along the days and overtime margins--to the higher marginal payroll tax rate in 
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Figure 10: Turnover and Pay Raises  
Panel A displays, by year of entry in IKA, the fraction of workers changing regular jobs from one year to 
the next among high earners (posted earnings above the old cap and affected by the reform) and medium 
earners (posted earnings between 1500 Euros and the old cap and not affected by the reform). Panel A 
suggests that turnover jumps up at the discontinuity for the treatment group.  Panel B displays, by year of 
entry in IKA, the fraction of workers experiencing a nominal regular monthly posted earnings (resp. gross 
earnings, net earnings) increase the following year for workers with regular earnings above the old cap in 
base year. Panel B displays a discontinuity for gross earnings and net earnings but not posted earnings, 
suggesting that pay increase decisions are based on earnings. Earnings records for March 2004, March 
2005, and March 2006 are combined. A. Contribution Rates (most common case):
Employer tax rate R Employee tax rate E
Combined rate 
=(R+E)/(1+R)
Retirement benefits 16.33% 9.67%
Sickness benefits 5.10% 2.55%
Unemployment benefits 5.53% 2.43%
Other benefits 1.10% 1.35%
Total 28.06% 16.00% 34.41%
B. Monthly Earning Cap for Contributions (2007):
Old regime
(individuals with covered earnings before 1/1/1993) € 2,315.00
New Regime
(individuals with no covered earnings before 1/1/1993) € 5,279.57
Table 1. IKA Payroll Tax System
Panel A displays contribution rates for employees covered by IKA in the most common case (coverage code
101). IKA contributions are assessed as a percentage of monthly earnings and shared between employees
and employers. Those contributions fund retirement benefits, sickness benefits, unemployment benefits,
and various other benefits. Contributions vary by coverage code corresponding to the occupation/sector of
the employee. For example, contribution rates are higher in hazardous occupations. IKA covers a total of 2
million employees (45% of all active workers in Greece). 
Panel B displays the earnings caps for IKA contributions. The cap applies on monthly earnings. The cap for
employer contributions is based on the sum of monthly earnings paid to a given employee (including
bonuses, overtime, etc.). The cap for employee contributions is based on the sum of monthly earnings from
all covered jobs for the given employee (employees with multiple jobs who reach the cap and have overpaid
contributions receive a refund from the government). The cap is 2,315 Euros for old regime workers. Old
regime workers are workers with positive covered earnings before 1/1/1993. The cap is 2.28 times higher at
5279.57 Euro for new regime workers. New regime workers are workers with no covered earnings before
1/1/1993. The caps have increased annually by 4% from 2004 to 2007. Under the old regime, the cap is pro-
rated on the number of days worked. It is not pro-rated in the case of new regime workers.1988-1992 
entrants,       
any earnings
1993-1997 










(1) (2) (3) (4)
Percent New Regime 0.2% 95.3% 0.1% 90.5%
[4.1%] [21.1%] [3.8%] [29.3%]
Percent Above Old Cap (2315 Euros) 10.4% 7.4% 100.0% 100.0%
[30.5%] [26.1%] [0%] [0%]
Percent Above New Cap (5280 Euros) 1.5% 0.9% 14.4% 12.5%
[12.1%] [9.5%] [35.1%] [33.0%]
Average Monthly Earnings € 1,427 € 1,262 € 4,185 € 3,991
[2021] [1731] [5396] [5508]
Average Monthly Regular Earnings € 1,233 € 1,095 € 2,879 € 2,575
[933] [689] [1929] [1394]
Percent with Overtime 11.3% 10.5% 19.2% 16.7%
[31.6%] [30.7%] [39.4%] [37.3%]
Percent with Bonuses 9.4% 9.3% 36.9% 44.8%
[29.1%] [29.1%] [48.2%] [49.7%]
Percent Male 54.2% 49.2% 68.6% 61.6%
[49.8%] [50.0%] [46.4%] [48.6%]
Average Age 39.1 34.9 40.0 36.2
[5.6] [5.9] [4.7] [4.9]
Number of jobs 1.036 1.048 1.043 1.056
[0.217] [0.254] [0.237] [0.274]
Number of workers in firm 743 794 1655 1744
[1878] [2035] [2491] [2575]
Percent changed jobs from March '06 22.0% 25.8% 12.1% 14.3%
to March '07 [41.4%] [43.7%] [32.6%] [35.0%]
Marginal Tax Rates (MTR)
Average employer MTR R 24.7% 26.7% 0.6% 20.4%
[9.0%] [5.0%] [4.1%] [11.0%]
Average employee MTR E 14.3% 15.3% 0.1% 11.5%
[5.5%] [3.4%] [1.2%] [6.4%]
Average total MTR =(R+E)/(1+R) 30.5% 32.9% 0.6% 25.3%
[11.0%] [6.0%] [3.8%] [13.5%]
Number of Observations: 208,374 225,758 21,648 16,624
The table displays summary statistics for 4 groups of individuals with Greek citizenship with positive IKA covered
earnings as of March 2007. Column (1) is the set of individuals who entered IKA (i.e., started having covered IKA
earnings) from 1988 to 1992 (old regime). Column (2) is the set of individuals who entered IKA (i.e., started having
covered IKA earnings) from 1993 to 1997 (new regime). Column (3) includes 1988-1992 entrants with total monthly
earnings above 2315 Euros in March 2007 (old regime cap). Column (4) includes 1993-1997 entrants with total monthly
earnings above 2315 Euros in March 2007 (old regime cap).
Table 2. Summary Statistics (March 2007)
The Table reports means and standard deviations in brackets. The percent new regime is not 100% for 1993-1997
entrants because individuals who can prove they had covered earnings in another insurance scheme before 1/1/1993
qualify for the old regime under IKA rules. Number of workers in firm is the average number of employees in the firm the
individual has his main job (defined as highest regular earnings). A change of job from March '06 to March '07 is defined
as a change in the employer for the main job (where regular earnings are highest). Earnings are defined as earnings
upon which payroll taxes are computed (posted earnings). Regular earnings include only base pay and exclude bonuses,
overtime, and other forms of earnings. The Marginal Tax Rates (MTR) are set equal to zero when the individual reaches











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OUTCOMES:
A. First Stage
Percent in new Regime (%) 89.25 89.39 89.12 87.38 88.96
(0.12) (0.22) (0.12) (0.19) (0.26)
Percent with earnings above cap (%) -5.87 -5.35 -5.89 -5.37 -5.24
(0.14) (0.22) (0.14) (0.21) (0.29)
Total MTR =(R+E)/(1+R) (%) 1.74 1.63 1.74 1.59 1.61
(0.05) (0.09) (0.05) (0.08) (0.11)
B. Identification Checks
Number of monthly entrants -690 -536 -529 22 -579
(347) (531) (291) (430) (595)
Number of monthly entrants  -44 -46 -29 10 -51
with posted earnings above old cap (28) (45) (25) (37) (50)
Age (in years) 0.075 0.233 -0.024 -0.022 0.080
(0.037) (0.061) (0.037) (0.056) (0.078)
Gender (% male) -3.14 0.09 -3.24 -0.03 0.33
(0.31) (0.49) (0.31) (0.46) (0.64)
Average posted earnings 7.76 9.00 7.52 8.52 3.88
 (capped at old cap, in Euros) (3.35) (5.36) (3.41) (5.05) (6.94)
Included Controls
Linear entry date trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Monthly dummies Yes Yes Yes
Quadratic date trends Yes Yes
Cubic entry date trends Yes
Number of Observations: 434,132 166,895 434,132 434,132 434,132
The table displays the coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses) from regressing various outcomes (listed in the left-
hand-side column) on a dummy for entering IKA on or after 1/1/1993 (which corresponds to new regime with higher earnings
cap). The sample includes all entrants with positive monthly earnings in March 2007 (results are very similar in the other
March 2004, March 2005, or March 2006 samples).
Table 3. First Stage Results and Identification Checks
Column (1) estimates includes a linear entry date (normalized to 0 at 1/1/1993) and a linear entry date interacted with the
dummy for entering IKA after 1/1/1993. Column (2) uses the same controls as column (1) but limits the sample to those
entering IKA from 1991 to 1994. Column (3-5) use all 1988-1997 entrants but add successively Monthly dummies (col. 3),
quadratic date trends (quadratic term and quadratic term interacted with the dummy for entering IKA after 1/1/1993), cubic
date trends (cubic term and cubic term interacted with the dummy for entering IKA after 1/1/1993).
New regime is a dummy for being in the new regime (with the higher cap). Earnings above cap is a dummy for having
earnings above the payroll tax earnings cap corresponding to the regime the individual is in. Total MTR is based on
combined employee and employer payroll tax rates and set at zero when the individual is above cap. In the case of the
"number of entrants" outcome variable, we collapse the data by month of entry and run the regression at the monthly level
(120 observations with 1988-1997 entrants, and 48 observations with 1991-1994 entrants). Average earnings (capped at old
cap) is equal to min(earnings,2315) where 2315 is the old cap earnings level (average earnings below the cap should not be











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OUTCOMES:
A. Individuals with earnings above old cap and capping earnings at new cap:
Gross Earnings z 111 144 104 108 139
(22) (36) (23) (34) (47)
Posted Earnings w  -29 2 -35 -25 0
(18) (30) (18) (28) (38)
Net Earnings c  -99 -74 -105 -97 -73
(16) (26) (16) (24) (34)
Number of Observations: 127,396 48,329 127,396 127,396 127,396
B. Individuals with regular earnings above old cap and capping earnings at new cap:
Regular Gross Earnings z 94 137 86 97 129
(29) (47) (29) (44) (62)
Regular Posted Earnings w  -40 5 -48 -25 3
(24) (39) (24) (37) (51)
Regular Net Earnings c  -106 -61 -113 -87 -57
(21) (35) (22) (33) (45)
Number of Observations: 74,543 28,099 74,543 74,543 74,543
C. Placebo: Individuals with earnings above 1500 Euros and capping earnings at old cap:
Gross Earnings z 1.5 -5.2 0.8 -9.8 -4.1
(4.0) (6.4) (4.0) (6.0) (8.3)
Posted Earnings w  2.1 -6.2 1.9 -8.3 -6.6
(3.1) (5.0) (3.2) (4.8) (6.6)
Net Earnings c  2.6 -7.8 2.7 -8.4 -9.0
(2.9) (4.7) (2.9) (4.4) (6.0)
Number of Observations: 357,348 136,985 357,348 357,348 357,348
Included Controls
Linear entry date trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Monthly dummies Yes Yes Yes
Quadratic date trends Yes Yes
Cubic entry date trends Yes
The table displays the coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses) from regressing various earnings outcomes (listed in the left-
hand-side column) on a dummy for entering IKA on or after 1/1/1993 (which corresponds to new regime with higher earnings cap). The
sample combines the 4 waves March 2004, March 2005, March 2006, March 2007. Standard errors are clustered by individual. Earnings
before 2007 are inflated by 4% per year so that caps coincide exactly across the 4 waves.
Table 4. Effects on Average Earnings above Old Cap
In panel A, the sample includes all entrants with monthly posted earnings above 2315 Euros (old cap). Posted earnings are capped at the
new cap (5280 Euros) (i.e., earnings above 5280 Euros are replaced by 5280). Gross earnings are capped at 5280*(1+R) (gross
earnings new cap) and net earnings are capped at 5280*(1-E) (net earnings new cap). In panel B, the sample includes all entrants with
regular monthly earnings above 2315 Euros (old cap). Regular earnings (gross, posted, and net) are also capped at the new caps
(5280*(1+R), 5280, and 5280*(1-E) Euros). In panel C, the sample includes all entrants with monthly posted earnings above 1500
Euros. Posted earnings are capped at the old cap (2315 Euros). Gross earnings are capped at 2315*(1+R) and net earnings are capped
at 2315*(1-E). 
Column (1) estimates includes a linear entry date (normalized to 0 at 1/1/1993) and a linear entry date interacted with the dummy for
entering IKA after 1/1/1993. Column (2) uses the same controls as column (1) but limits the sample to those entering IKA from 1991 to
1994. Column (3-5) use all 1988-1997 entrants but add successively Monthly dummies (col. 3), quadratic date trends (quadratic term and
quadratic term interacted with the dummy for entering IKA after 1/1/1993), cubic date trends (cubic term and cubic term interacted with












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OUTCOMES:
A. Total Earnings:
Percent with Earnings above 3000 Euros: 0.494 0.135 -0.134 0.301 -0.079 -0.353
(0.094) (0.097) (0.099) (0.147) (0.153) (0.156)
Percent with Earnings above 5000 Euros: 0.148 -0.043 -0.208 0.178 0.019 -0.139
(0.047) (0.052) (0.055) (0.075) (0.082) (0.087)
Percent with Earnings above 2000 Euros: 0.546 0.482 0.500 0.175 0.031 0.068
(Placebo) (0.158) (0.157) (0.154) (0.250) (0.248) (0.244)
Number of Observations: 1,781,559 1,781,559 1,781,559 685,415 685,415 685,415
B. Regular Earnings:
Percent with Earnings above 3000 Euros: 0.220 -0.004 -0.173 0.186 0.002 -0.153
(0.071) (0.074) (0.076) (0.112) (0.118) (0.120)
Percent with Earnings above 5000 Euros: 0.035 -0.081 -0.173 0.079 -0.031 -0.111
(0.032) (0.036) (0.039) (0.052) (0.058) (0.061)
Percent with Earnings above 2000 Euros: 0.167 0.148 0.141 0.072 -0.009 0.006
(Placebo) (0.132) (0.131) (0.128) (0.208) (0.206) (0.202)
Number of Observations: 1,781,624 1,781,624 1,781,624 685,439 685,439 685,439
The table displays the coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses) from regressing various outcomes (listed in the left-hand-side
column) on a dummy for entering IKA on or after 1/1/1993 (which corresponds to new regime with higher earnings cap), and linear controls
in date of entry and date of entry interacted with post 1/1/1993 dummy as in colmuns (1) and (2) of Table 4. The sample combines the 4
waves March 2004, March 2005, March 2006, March 2007. Standard errors are clustered by individual. Earnings before 2007 are inflated
by 4% per year so that caps coincide exactly across the 4 waves. Columns (1) to (3) are based on all 1988-1997 entrants while columns
(4) to (6) restrict the sample to 1991-1994 entrants. Outcomes are based on gross earnings in columns (1) and (4), on earnings in columns
(2) and (5), and on net earnings in columns (3) and (6). 
Table 5. Effects on Probability of High Earnings
In panel A, the sample includes all individuals with positive earnings. In panel B, the sample includes all individual with positive regular
earnings. All estimates are expressed in percent (i.e., each left-hand-side variable dummy is set equal to 0 or 100).












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OUTCOMES: Average Earnings (capped at new cap) for individuals with earnings above old cap
A. Age Effects:
Young workers  127 -19 -94 158 11 -69
(aged 27 or less when entering IKA) (23) (19) (17) (38) (31) (28)
Number of Observations: 107,082 107,082 107,082 40,299 40,299 40,299
Older workers  -19 -117 -160 -1 -107 -155
(aged over 27 when entering IKA) (62) (50) (44) (100) (81) (71)
Number of Observations: 20,314 20,314 20,314 8,030 8,030 8,030
B. Gender Effects:
Male Workers 131 -13 -86 147 3 -72
(28) (23) (20) (46) (37) (33)
Number of Observations: 83,846 83,846 83,846 32,001 32,001 32,001
Female Workers 100 -43 -115 151 7 -72
(35) (29) (26) (57) (47) (42)
Number of Observations: 43,550 43,550 43,550 16,328 16,328 16,328
C. Firm's size:
Small firms (<400 workers) 117 -20 -90 122 -2 -66
(31) (25) (22) (51) (42) (36)
Number of Observations: 65,531 65,531 65,531 24,944 24,944 24,944
Large firms (>400 workers) 114 -34 -108 169 6 -83
(30) (25) (22) (49) (41) (36)
Number of Observations: 61,865 61,865 61,865 23,385 23,385 23,385
The table displays the coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses) from regressing earnings outcomes on a dummy for entering IKA
on or after 1/1/1993 (which corresponds to new regime with higher earnings cap), and linear controls in date of entry and date of entry
interacted with post 1/1/1993 dummy as in colmuns (1) and (2) of Table 4. The sample combines the 4 waves March 2004, March 2005,
March 2006, March 2007. Standard errors are clustered by individual. Earnings before 2007 are inflated by 4% per year so that caps
coincide exactly across the 4 waves. Columns (1) to (3) are based on all 1988-1997 entrants while columns (4) to (6) restrict the sample to
1991-1994 entrants. Outcomes are based on gross earnings in columns (1) and (4), on posted earnings in columns (2) and (5), and on net
earnings in columns (3) and (6). In all cases, the left-hand-side variable is earnings capped at the new cap, and the sample is always
limited to workers with earnings above the old cap.
Table 6. Effects on Earnings: Heterogeneity across Groups
Panel A focuses on age effects and uses total earnings. In the first row of estimates, the sample is limited to workers entering IKA at age
27 or younger. In the second row, the sample is limited to older workers entering IKA after age 27. Panel B focuses on gender effects and
uses total earnings. In the first row of estimates, the sample is limited to male workers. In the second row, the sample is limited to female
workers. Panel C focuses on firm's size effects and uses total earnings. In the first row of estimates, the sample is limited to workers in
small firms (defined as firms with less than 400 workers). In the second row, the sample is limited to workers in large firms (>400 workers). 











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OUTCOMES:
A. Labor Supply (workers with daily regular earnings above old cap)
Number of Days in Regular Job 0.006 -0.052 -0.002 -0.070 -0.077
(0.035) (0.055) (0.036) (0.053) (0.070)
Percent with Overtime 0.36 2.20 0.17 1.73 1.91
(0.53) (0.85) (0.54) (0.80) (1.08)
Percent with Bonus 1.80 2.09 1.94 1.30 3.53
(1.08) (1.75) (1.10) (1.64) (2.27)
Percent with Multiple Jobs 0.24 0.61 0.09 -0.15 0.94
(0.44) (0.69) (0.46) (0.65) (0.86)
Hours of work -0.161 0.241 -0.355 0.258 -0.916
(0.495) (0.781) (0.507) (0.739) (1.006)
Elasticity of hours of work with respect to 0.019 0.007 0.032 0.001 0.134
the net of employee payroll tax rate (0.035) (0.065) (0.035) (0.061) (0.097)
Number of Observations: 57,675 21,593 57,675 57,675 57,675
B. Turnover (Workers with total earnings above old cap)
Percent Changing Jobs Next Year 0.77 1.97 0.90 2.57 2.26
(0.56) (0.90) (0.57) (0.85) (1.17)
Number of Observations: 89,124 33,781 89,124 89,124 89,124
C. Nominal Regular Earnings Raise (Workers with regular earnings above old cap)
Percent with nominal gross reg. earnings raise -6.13 -3.87 -6.16 -4.36 -3.78
(0.78) (1.25) (0.79) (1.18) (1.61)
Percent with nominal reg. posted earnings raise -1.00 0.10 -0.98 0.00 -0.43
(0.82) (1.32) (0.83) (1.25) (1.71)
Percent with nominal net reg. earnings raise 4.82 5.00 4.91 4.29 3.41
(0.96) (1.56) (0.97) (1.46) (2.03)
Number of Observations: 48,962 18,422 48,962 48,962 48,962
Included Controls
Linear entry date trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Monthly dummies Yes Yes Yes
Quadratic date trends Yes Yes
Cubic entry date trends Yes
In Panel B, the sample is limited to workers with earnings in base year above the old cap. Percent changing jobs is a dummy for not having the
same main employer in the following year (in case of multiple employers, main employer is defined as the employer with whom regular earnings
are highest). In Panel C, the sample is limited to workers with regular earnings in base year above the old cap. Percent with earnings (resp.
gross earnings, net earnings) raise is a dummy for experiencing a nominal regular earnings (resp. gross earnings, net earnings) increase in the
following year.
The table displays the coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses) from regressing various outcomes (listed in the left-hand-side column)
on a dummy for entering IKA on or after 1/1/1993 (which corresponds to new regime with higher earnings cap). The sample combines the 4
waves March 2004, March 2005, March 2006, March 2007. Standard errors are clustered by individual. Earnings before 2007 are inflated by
4% per year so that caps coincide exactly across the 4 waves. For all dummy outcomes, estimates are expressed in percent (i.e., the dummy is
set equal to 0 or 100 in the regression).
Table 7. Labor Supply, Turnover, and Pay Raises Effects
In panel A, the sample is limited to workers with regular earnings per day of work above 2500/25 Euros, i.e., would reach the old cap by working
full month. Number of days is the recorded number of days worked during the month. Percent with Overtime is a dummy for having positive
overtime earnings. Percent bonus is a dummy for having positive bonus earnings. Percent with Multiple jobs is a dummy for having positive
earnings from more than one employer. Monthly hours of work are estimated as number of days in the regular job times 8 (or 4 if part-day)
times (1+overtime earnings/regular earnings). Monthly hours are capped at 300. The elasticity of hours of work is obtained from a 2SLS
regression of log(hours) on log(1-tE) where tE is employee marginal payroll tax rate instrumented with a dummy for entering IKA after 1/1/1993
(and adding controls as in the other OLS regressions in the table).
Column (1) estimates includes a linear entry date (normalized to 0 at 1/1/1993) and a linear entry date interacted with the dummy for entering
IKA after 1/1/1993. Column (2) uses the same controls as column (1) but limits the sample to those entering IKA from 1991 to 1994. Column (3-
5) use all 1988-1997 entrants but add successively Monthly dummies (col. 3), quadratic date trends (quadratic term and quadratic term
interacted with the dummy for entering IKA after 1/1/1993), cubic date trends (cubic term and cubic term interacted with the dummy for entering
IKA after 1/1/1993). Annex I 
Questions in the Survey of Employers 
 
  When you recruit a relatively young executive, do you know (or ask) which insurance regime 
s/he is under? 
  Are you aware that social contributions for high earners first insured in 1993 or later are higher, 
due to the fact that their upper earnings ceiling is higher (e.g. €5,280 vs. €2,315 in 2007)? 
If yes, do you take this factor into consideration when you take decisions with respect to hiring, 
paying, promoting or firing employees? 
More specifically, does the different social insurance regime make it more likely for you to: 
  avoid recruitment of high-earning “new insurees”? 
  offer lower remuneration to high-earning new insurees (as their labour costs may be 
higher) compared to older workers with similar skills? 
  grant high-earning new insurees lower pay rises (to recoup the extra cost in terms of 
social contributions) compared to older workers with similar skills? 
  make new insurees redundant ahead of older workers with similar skills? 
If not, why should a profit-maximising firm not take this factor into consideration? 
[let the interviewee respond spontaneously and then ask:] 
Is it because the firm is concerned that discriminations on grounds of social insurance regime 
might: 
  provoke new insurees to take legal action? 
  harm morale in the firm? 
  cause a reaction on the part of unions? 
 